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An owner of a lot conveyed it to another person by deed with covenant of general warranty. At the date of the conveyance a portion of
the lot was enclosed by a fence, with other land of the vendor. -The
vendee entered into possession of the remaining part of the lot, but
never had possession of the enclosed part. Held, that the vendor could
not acquire title tp the enclosed part by adverse possession.
MITCHELL,

j., dissented.

ADvERsE PossEssIOt

B.TWICEN VZNDOR AND VENDEE.

The line of authorities in Pennsylvania lead to the support of the
doctrine as laid down in this case,
but the question of adverse possession, especially in cases arising
between vendor and vendee, drifts
almost imperceptibly into a question of evidence, and, as to Pennsylvania cases, will have to be
taken as an instance of the variance of a settled principle of law
by the evidence. In Olwine v.
Holman, 23 Pa. St., 279, the rule
was laid down as follows: When a
vendor sells a piece of laid enclosed
with his other land, and the piece
sold continues afterwards to be enclosed and used and occupied by
the vendor as before, such occupancy will be deemed to be in subservience to the right of thevendee
and not adverse thereto. A vendor,
I Rep6rted in X52 Pa. St., 444.

after conveyance and before delivery of possession, is to be regarded as a trustee for the vendee,
so far as regards the possession, just
as he was a trustee of the title
before conveyance. If he wishes
to change the character of the possession he must manifest is intention by some act of hostility to
the title of his vendee, plainly indicating to the latter the intention
to deny his right and to hold adversely to it: Buckholder v. Sigler,
7 W. & S., 154. PAXSON, C. J.,
said in Ingles v. Ingles, 15o Pa. St.,
397: This well-established rule
applies with special force between
a father and his son. 'In such instances it is not unusual for the
vendee to leave the vendor in possession for an indefinite period or
for life. Such transactions are
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often 'arrangements to suit, the
family convenience. The possession of the vendor is the possession
of the vendee, and until some unequivocal act is done by the vendor,
the knowledge of which is brought
home to the vendee, tending to
show that the former holds adversely, no question of the Statute
of Limitations can arise.
After a sale of land by articles of
agreement and payment of the
purchase money, the vendee died
and his wife and children left the
land; the vendor placed a tenant
on it and the possession continued
in him and those claiming under.
him twenty-one years. Held, that
it was erroneous to charge the jury
that the putting on the tenant was
not an ouster, unless they believed.
that the vendor intended to commit
an ouster: Pipher v. Lodge, i6 S.
& R., 214; Watson v. Gregg, Io
Watts, 289.
In i8oI the City of New York
sold to W,. lot No. 194 of its "common lands," so-called, the deed
describing it as then being in the
possession of W. In i8o4 the city
leased lot No. 193, adjoining lot
x94 on the south. There was then a
wall line clearly marking W.'s possession on the south. The tenants
of the city occupied lot 193 from the
time of said leasing contiuously up
to 1852, having possession and cultivating up to said line, W. and his
successors in interest occupying
north of the line. The city also
paid assessments up to said line.
Upon the city maps said line was
recognized as the boundary between the lots. From 1852 up to
i866 the lands south of sald lme
remained vacant. In the year last
mentioned they were sold by the
city to defendant, K. In an action
of ejectment brought to recover a

parcel of land lying south of said
line, it was held that if the same
was covered by the description in
the deed to W., the city re-acquired
title by adverse possession. That
its possession could not be presumed to have been in subordination to W.'s title, and that the title
so acquired was not lost by the
failure to occupy after 1852: Sherman v. Kane, 86 N. Y., 57The non-claim by a grantee of
an interest in land for a period of
thirty-four years after acquiring
title is, in an action against the
heir of the grantor, no bar to a
recovery; nor does the exclusive
possession of the land by the
grantor and his heirs for that
length of time afford per se the
presumption of d re-conveyance or
surrinder of the interest conveyed,
as long as the nature of the possession is consistent with the rights of
the grantee: Butler v. Phelps, 17
Wendell, 642; Creekmur v. Creekmur, 75 Virginia, 430; Burhans v.
Van Zandt, 7 Bar., 91; Jackson v.
Brink, 5 Conn., 83 Millard v. McMullin, 46 N. Y.', 345; Cramer v.
Benton, 4 Lans., 291; Chalfin v.
Malone, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.), 596.
In Burhans v. Van Zandt, 7
Barb., 91, the Court said: "By the
execution and delivery of a deed
of land the entire legal interest
in the premises becomes vested in
the grantee, and if the grantor continues in possession afterwards, his
possession is not that of owner,
but of a tenant of the grantee. He
will be iegarded as holding the
premises in subserviency to his
grantee, and nothing short of an
explicit disclaimer of such relation, and a notorious assertion of
right in himself will be sufficient
to change the character of his possession and render it adverse to the
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grantee. But from the time the
grantor explicitly disclaims holding under the grantee, and openly
asserts his title to the premises in
hostility to the title claimed under
his own previous deed his possession becomes adverse, even
though he knew his title to be bad,
and from that moment the Statute
of Limitations will begin to run."
A person may reacquire title to
property that he has once parted
with by the same process through
which he might originally have acquired it, and if the plaintiff conveyed the premises in question by
deed to the defendant, and for
twenty years thereafterwards held
open notorious exclusive adverse
possession of them, he reacquired
title to them as effectually as
though she had reconveyed them
to him: Traip v. Traip, 57 Maine,
268.
One who has conveyed land may
disseize his grantee, and will in
such case by twenty years' adverse
possession bar the entry of his
grantee and his heirs: Tilton v.
Emery, 17 N. H., 536.
The general rule is that possession of land is notice to a purchaser of the possessor's title.
But this rule does not apply to a
vendor remaining in possession so
as to require a purchaser from his
grantee to inquire whether he has
reserved any interest in the land
conveyed; so far as the purchaser is
concerned the vendor's deed is conclusive on that subject: Van Keuren v. Central R. R., 47 N.J. L.,
165.
Where in ejectment it appears
that a division fence was by mistake built and maintained for more
than ten years over the line on
plaintiff's land, and that defendant and his grantors claimed to

own the land to the fence, and had
actual possession thereof during
such period with the knowledge
and acquiescence of plaiutiff, such
possession was adverse, though the
acquiescence of plaintiff was because he supposed the fence was
on the true line: Ramsey v. Ogden, 31 Pac. Rep., 778; Crary V.
Goodman, 22 N. Y., 175.
If a party occupies land up to a
certain fence because he believes it
to be the line, but having no intention to claim up to the fence if it
should be beyond the line, an indispensable element of adverse
possession is wanting. The intent
to claim does not exist, and the
claim which is set up is upon the
condition that the fence is upon
the line: Brown v. Cockerell, 33
Ala., 45.
When a person who has conveyed property by a warranty deed
subsequently acquires an interest
in the same property by a tax title,
and conveys his subsequently acquired title in a portion of the
property to third parties who reside
thereon for more than ten years,
their title cannot be attacked:
Reilly v. Blaser, 28 N. W. Rep.
(Mich.), 151.
The grantor who conveys by a
quit-claim deed may remain in
possession of the property conveyed, and assert and maintain an
adverse possession for the term of
five years, and thus acquire a title
as against the grantee by the Statute of Limitations: Dorland v.
Majilton, 47 Cal., 455.
A defendant in execution who
remains upon land after it is sold
under execution, does not occupy
the attitude of tenant or quasi-tenant of the purchaser. There is no
estoppel upon the defendant which
precludes him from converting the
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amicable possession into one that
is adverse and hostile. The law
'does not merely, from the fact that
he continues in possession, raise
the presumption that the possession is adverse, but devolves upon
him the burden of evincing, if he
relies upon it, that such has been
its true nature and character: Chalfin v. Malone, 9 B. Mon. (Ken.),
496.
An adverse and exclusive possession of land for a period of
tventy years is a good bar to a
writ of entry to recover the same,
although the demandant's title
may have been derived through
mesne conveyances from the tenant, nor is the tenant estopped by
his covenants of warranty in the
deed to his original grantee from
setting up a subsequent title acquired by disseisin: Stearns v.

Hendersass, 9 Cush.-(Mass.), 497.
In Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis.,
498, the Court said: "There would
seem to be no good reason why the
possession of a grantor may not be
hostile to his deed, provided it be
such as to give his grantee notice
that he claims in hostility to his
grant; nor why such hostile possession may not ripen into an adverse and perfect title and bar the
grantee from recovering the possession under the Statute of Limitations. We are, however, of the
opinion that when the possession
has been for a long period, the
presumption of a claim of iight
hostile to the title granted does
arise in every case where such possession is inconsistent with the
rights of the grantee, and that in
such case account of jury' might
find'the possession adverse from
the nature of the possession without proof of an express declaration on the part of the occupant

that he claimed to hold in hostility
to his grant.
"We believe it to be more -in
harmony with the settled rules applicable to cases of adverse jossession to hold, that whether he
holds in subserviency to the grant
or in hostility thereto depends
upon the nature of the possession,
and is generally a question of fact
and not of law, and that the length
of the possession is a circumstance
to be considered in determining
the nature of the possession."
It is undoubtedly true that one
who enters into the possession of
land in subordination to the title of
the real owner is estopped from
denying that title while he holds
actually or presumptively under it.
But a trustee may disavow and disclaim this trust, the tenaht the title
of his landlord after the expiration
of his lease, the vendee the title of
his vendor after breach of his contract, and the tenant in common
the title of his co-tenant, and drive
the respective owners and claimants
to their action within the period of
the Statute of Limitations.
A tenant of land under an agreement to purchase which contemplates a continuing right of possession while the contract is being
performed, and an absolute right of
possession by virtue of its performance may on performance deny the
title of the vendor, and thereafter
his possession will be adverse: Catlin v. Decker, 38 Conn., 262.
If one buys land with borrowed
money, taking the title in the name
of the lender, and goes into possession under an agreement with the
lender that the title is to be conveyed to him whenever he repays
the loan, his possession will not
become adverse as against the
lender until he has made an open
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.and explicit disavowal of the lender's title and assertion of title in
himself, and such disavowal and
assertion have been brought home
-to the lender: Estes v. Long, 71
Mo., 605.
The mere continued possession
-of the vendor of lands is not adverse to his vendee: Ingles v.
-Ingles, 15O Pa., 397; Olwine v.

Holman,

23 Pa. St., 279; Ronan v.
Meyer, 84 Ind., 391; Record v.
Ketcham, 76 Ind., 482; R. R. Co.
v. Oyler, 82 Ind., 394; Jackson v.
Benton, i Wendell, 341; Doe v.
Butler, 3 Wendell, i49; Higginson
v. Mein, 4 Cranch, 414; Bresler v.
Pitt, 58 Mich., 347; Beach v. Catlin, 4 Day (Conn.), 284.

JOSEPH

NELSON "V. SHELBY MANUFACTURING
COMPANY.'

T. TAYLOR.

AND IMPROVEMENT

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.

emorandum-Saleof Real Estate-Statuteof Frauds.
The plaintiff, Nelson, sued in assumpsit to recover money paid as
-part payment for the purchase of certain lots sold to him by the defendant. Upon selection of each lot by plaintiff, he was given a memorandum
as follows: "Sold to Frank Nelson, Jr., i lot, i, R. 70, block 63, 10.00,
for the Shelby Manufacturing and Improvement Co. By J. Schwed."
Upon presentation of this memorandum to the treasurer, and a onethird cash payment, a written instrument as follows was delivered to the
purchaser: "No. 277. Shelby Manufacturing and Improvement Co.,
Shelby, Ala., April 3, 189 ° . Received of Frank Nelson, Jr.,.$233.33, being
one-third cash payment on lot No. i, of block No. 63. Bond for title to
said lot will be delivered on execution of notes for balance of purchase
money, and return of this receipt properly endorsed. T. H. Hopkins."
Held, that the memorandum subscribed by the vendor to execute bond
for title was void under the Statute of Frauds, and that a failure to perform it by the vendor gave the plaintiff no cause of.action against him.
Or RZAL ESTATE UNDER THB
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

MEMORANDA F OR TH4 SALr.

The Statute of Frauds, under the
Alabama code, 1732, provides that
every contract for the sale of
lands, saving leases for one year,
shall be void, unless payment is
made and the purchaser put into
possession, or unless a memorandum of the sale, expressing the
.consideration, is in writing, sub1

So. Rep., 695.

scribed by the party to be charged
or his duly authorized agent. In
the opinion rendered in the above
case, Justice CoLEMAx said : "We
may concede the memorandum to
be complete in all respects, except
as to the terms of the payment. It
says one-third cash, and 'notes
to be executed for the balance.'

Decided November 2, 1892.
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Whether these notes are to bear
-interest, and, if so, the rate of interest, or to be payable in two or
ten years, or whether there were to
be 'two or a half a dozen notes is
not stated. To permit parol evidence to be introduced to supply
the omission would break down
the safe-guards intended to be secured by the statute in all contracts for the sale of land."
In its .adoption by the various
States, the English statute has been
somewhat altered and abridged. In
Pennsylvania, for example, the first
three sections were adopted in 1772;
but the fourth section, requiring a
note or memorandum of "any contract or sale of lands, tenements or
hereditaments, or any interest in
,or concerning them," has never
been adopted by that State as to
contracts for the sale of lands:
Malana v. Ammon, I Barr, 139.
The courts of Pennsylvania, however, hold that no contract for the
sale of land will be specifically enforced in default of a sufficient
memorandum of the sale, and they
refuse in such cases to allow the
price of the land agreed to be conveyed to be taken as the measure
of damages for a breach of the
agreement: Wible v. Wible, i
Grant, 406; Sales v. Heckman, 20
Pa. St., i8o; Everhart's App., Io6
Pa. St., 349; Bowers v. Bowers, 95
Pa. St., 471. It should be borne in
mind that the statute does not require the contract of sale to be in
writing, but only a note or memorandum thereof. The two should
'not be confused.
Where a memorandum is necessary, the agreement itself is not written, but oral.
The suit is not founded upon the
writing; it is based upon the oral
contract, and all that the statute is
intended to secure is some adequate

writen evidence of the contract,
such evidence being preferable to,
an oral description drawn from an
uncertain or biased recollection.
GeneralRequisites.-A sufficient
memorandum made and signed by
the party to be charged, binds him,
although not delivered, if made
with the intent that it should constitute a memorandum of the contract of the sale. In Johnson v.
Dodgson, 2 M. & W., 653, counsel
asked whether a memorandum en-'
tered by defendant in his own
book, that plaintiffs had sold to.
him would be sufficient. Baron
PARK:E'S answer was: "If he meant
it to be a memorandum of the contract between the parties, it would;
not so if he meant it to be a merememorandum to be kept by himself for himself." See, also, on.
this point, Kuhn V. Brown, i Hun.
(N. Y.), 244; Drury v. Young, 58Md., 546; Bowles zr. Woodson, 6.
Gratt. (Va.), 78; Remington v.
Lithicum, 14 Pet (U. S.), 84; Boyd,.
etc., v. Terrill, 13 Bush. (Ky.), 463.
The memorandum must contaii,
either expressly or by necessary
inference, every material part of
the agreement; and must show,
not a treaty pending, but a contract concluded. It should express
the consideration, the terms, theparties, the property, and be signed
by the party to be charged, or hisagent. Unless the contract be actually concluded and certain in all
its parts, equity will not interfere
to grant specific performance : Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala., 345;
Phillips v. Adams, 7o Ala., 376;
Carter v. Shorter, 57 Ala., 253;.
Fry, Spec. Perf.,
164,203; McKibbin v. Brown, 14 N. J. Eq., 13.
The writing, to meet the requirements of the statute, need not give
all the details, but it must express.
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he substance of the contract with
easonable certainty, either by its
.wnterms or by reference to some
,ther agreement or writing from
Nhich it can be ascertained with
.ike reasonable certainty. Atwood
v.Cobb, i6 Pick., 227; Ives v. Hazard, 4 R. I., 29; Meadows v.
Meadows, 3 McCord, 458; Seymour
v. Belding, 83 Ill., 222; Weaver v.
Fries, 85 id., 356; Frazer v. Howe,
ro6 Ill., 563. In Miller v. Wilson,
31 N. E. Rep., 423 (Ill. Sup. Ct.,
1892), in an action for the price of
and, the written evidence consisted
of a letter bi defendant to plaintiff,
dated October 24, 1887, saying:
"Should I take a notion to buy the
lot adjoining the three I bought,
what would be your lowest price
for it? I feel that I. paid a pretty
good price for the three lots; 120
x i4o is a small farm for $iooo."
Also a note signed by defendant,
saying: "Not having received
funds, I forfeit the above $ioo, and
relinquish all claim to the above
lots," which note was attached to
the following receipt, signed by
plaintiff: "Received of (defendant) $ioo in cash, in consideration
of which, and the further payment
of $g9oo, to be paid on or before the
21st day of January, 1888, I agree to
convey to him by warranty deed lots
5, 6 and 7 of block I, in M. M. Miller's addition to Clay Center, Kansas." It was held that such writings
were insufficient to constitute anote
or memorandum in writing, signed
by the defendant, of a contract to
purchase land, as required by Rev.
Stat, 1891, c. 59, 2. The Court, per
ScHOLFIELD, J., said: "The contention is that the note of October
24, 1887, isasufficientmemorandum
of the contract. But that does not
state the terms of any contract. It
is true that it acknowledges a pre-

vious purchase of lots, but not when
or on what terms. It promises to
pay nothing, but, on the contrary,
speaks of the lots as 'paid for,'
and it acknowledges no existing
indebtedness." And parol evidence
was held inadmissible to prove
what, under the issue, could only
be proved by a writing.
In Littell v. Jones, I9S. V. Rep,

497 (Ark. Sup. Ct.,

1892),

a memo-

randum reciting the receipt by L.
from R. of money on account of
the amount due on a certain judgment, and reciting that it was received in and upon an agreement
of compromise, whereby R had
agreed to pay off the judgment,
was held not a sufficient writing to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds as to
the sale of land, and show an agreement by L. to relinquish his claim
to lands bought at execution sale
on the judgment, time to redeem
from which had expired. The Court
said: "We do not consider the receipt a sufficient writing to answer
the requirement of the statute. It
not only does not disclose the terms
of the contract relied upon, but of
itself, and without the aid of oral
proof, it furnishes no intimation
of the the essential provisions of
the agreement."
That the memorandum must
show an agreement concluded is
illustrated in the case of Williston
v. Lawson, i9 Canada Sup. Ct., 673.
Defendant signed a paper agreeing
to sell certain lands to plaintiff for
$42,5oo, and plaintiff signed a paper
agreeing to purchase the same.
The papers were substantially the
same, except that the one signed
by plaintiff stated that he was to
purchase "subject to the encumbrance thereon," and each paper
recited at the end, "Terms and
deeds to be arranged by the ist of
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May next." On the day the papers
were signed defendant, on request
of plaintiffs solicitor, added to the
paper signed by him the following:
"Terms $5oo cash this day, $5ooon
delivery of the deed of the Parker
property, $8oo with interest every
three months until the $65oo are
paid, when the deed of the entire
property will be executed." The
property mentioned in the papers,
with other property of defendant,
was mortgaged for $36,ooo. Plaintiff paid the two sums of $5oo, and
demanded a deed of the Parker
property, which being refused, he
sued to compel defendant to per. form the contract.
It was held
that there was no completed agreemext in writing to $atisfy the Statute of Frauds.
. A memorandum of a sale of land
at auction is sufficient, which contains the names of the vendor and
purchaser, the terms of the sale,
the amount bid and paid, and a description of the land sufficient to
enable the purchaser, from surrounding facts and circumstances,
to identify and locate it. The insertion by the auctioneer, at the
time of the sale, and in the presence of the defendant, of the latter's name in the memorandum of
sale as the purchaser is a sufficient
execution of the contract to bind
him as the party to be charged
thereby: Springer v. Kleinsorge,
83 Mo., 152.
When, at an auction sale under
a deed of trust, the trustee acts as
his own auctioneer, he cannot bind
the purchaser by a memorandum of
the sale made by himselfso as to
hold him liable within the meaning
of the statute. Although acting as
auctioneer, he is a party to the sale,
with natural interest and bias adverse to the purchaser; and the
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circumstance that he has no beneficial interest in the subject-matterof the sale settles nothing as to his.
bias: Tull ?. David, 45 Mo., 444.
A written advertisement or notice
of a trustee's sale, signed by the
trustee, is not a sufficient memorandum within the statute: Whitev. Watkins, 23 Mo., 423.
Time of Making the Memorandum.-It seems to be the settled
rule that the memorandum may be.
made at any time subsequent to theformation of the contract, and before action brought, except in sales.
by auctioneers: Bird v. Monroe,
66 Mo., 347; Bill v. Bament, ,9M.
& W., 36; Williams v. Bacon, 2Gray (Mass.), 387; Hewes 7.. Tay-lor, 7o Pa. St., 387.
It would
seem rational to hold that it (thememorandum) may be made even
after suit is brought, so long as thetrial has not been had. But thereappears to have been no direct decision to that effect, and the weight
of opinion is against it: Browne onSt. of Frauds, 352, p. 435. See
Rose v. Cunynghame, iI Ves., 550..
With respect to sales made by
auctioneers the decisions hold that
an auctioneer's entry, to be valid as.
a memorandum, must be made
contemporaneously with the sale :Buckmaster v. Harrop, 13 Vei., per
Lord Chancellor ERSxIN.
There are decisions which holdthat the memorandum will answer
if made on the day of the sale,
shortly after it: Barclay v. Bates, 2
Mo. App., 139. The language of'
many of the cases, apparently uncontradicted, is, that the name ofthe purchasermust be written down.
by the auctioneer immediately after
the announcement of the bid and
the fall of the hammer: Browne on
the Stat. of Frauds, 353, p. 436.
The cases appear to draw distinc--
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tion between the auctioneer'sagen- ters from a vendor to his agent may
cy for the seller, and his agency for constitute a sufficient note or memthe buyer. In the former the auc- orandum of an agreement to convey
tioneer is permitted to sign the land, if, from such letters, the terms
memorandum some time after the and proposal of sale, the descripsale, but in the latter he must do tion of the property, and the affirmthis contemporaneously with the ance of a sale made by the agent
can be gathered: Lee v. Cherry
sale: Gill v. Bicknell, 2 Cush
(Tenn.), 4 S. W. Rep.i 835.
(Mass.), 355; Mews v. Carr, Hurl.
A writing, purporting to be a con& N., 484; Horton v. McCarty, 53
tract for the sale of land, which
Mo., 394.
Forin.-Theform of the memo- does not specifythe purchase price,
randum is not material. It may nor the terms of payment, is insufficonsist of letters, telegrams or ac- cient, and is not aided by a subsecounts. If the terms of the contract quent letter of the party sought to.
may be gathered from it the sta- be charged, instructing his agent
tute is satisfied, whatever form it how to fill out the contract, if one
may assume: Heidman v. Wolf- should be executed: Webster v.
stein, 12 Mo. App., 266; Moore v. Brown (Mich.), "34 N. W. Rep.,
Mountcastle, 61 Mo., 424; Thayer
v. Luce, 22 Ohio St., 62; Whaley

v. Hinchman, 22 Mo. App., 483;
Pierce v. Corf,'L. R., 9 Q. B., 210;
Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558.
The agreement is sufficient if it appear from different memoranda; it"
need not all be contained in one
writing. A memorandum of a sale
of real estate, which consists of two
papers, must contain such a reference from one to the other as will
serve to connect the two, and such
as will conduct the searcher from
one to the other with reasonable
certainty. Per THOMPSON, J., in
Boeckeler v. McGowan, 12 Mo.
App., 507; Schroeder v. Taaffe. Xi
Mo., 267 ; Wiley v. Roberts, 27 Mo.,

388; Briggs v. Munchon, 56 Mo.,
467 ; Christensen v. Wooley, 41 Mo.
App., 53.
A valid contract for the sale of
land may be embraced wholly in
letters written concerning such
land; and it is not absolutely essential that the letters should be addressed by one of the contracting
parties to the other: Hollis 'v. Burgess (Kan.), x5 Pac. Rep., 536. Let-

676.
SignatureofPartyto be Charged.
-Thememorandum mustbe signed
by the party to be charged. The
statute is not strictly construed in
this respect, and anyihing done indicating a clear intention to sign isusually held sufficient. The signature may be printed or stamped; it
may be by mark or by initials, or
may even be a fictitious name. It
cannot, however, consist of a mere
designation of the writer. In Selby
v. Selby, 3 Meriv., 2, the words,
"'Your dear mother," were held insufficient to constitute a signature"
Tagiasco v. Molinau, 9 La. kO. S.),
512; Hubert v. Moreau, 12 Moore
(C. P.), 216; Brown v. Butchers'
Bank, 6 Hill, 443; Palmer v. Stephens, i Denio, 478; Safiborn v.
Flagler, 6 Allen, 474; Augur v.
Couture, 68 Me., 427.
. In the case of a memorandum
made by telegraph, the sender's
signature to the blanks filled out
by him is sufficient: Godwin v.
Francis, L. R. C. P., 295; Little
v. Dougherly (Col.), I7 Pac. Rep.,
292.
If the memorandum is to be
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signed only, a signature in any
part will answer; but if it is to be
subscribed, it must appear at the
bottom of the memorandum: Brayley v. Kelley, 25\*inn., 16o; Brown
'on Stat. or Frauds, 356; Merritt
v. Clason, 12 Johns., 102; Draper
v. Platina, 2 Speers, 292; Clason V.
Bartley, 14 Johns., 484; Tiedeman
on Sales, 77.
If it sufficiently appears that the
signature was intended to govern
the whole agreement, it is immaterial in what part of the memorandum it appears; but if it be not
intended to govern the whole agreeiient, its position may make a difference. In Caton v. Caton, L. R.,
2, H. L., 127, Lord WESTBURY
said: "If a signature be found in
an instrument incidentally only, or
having relation and reference only
to a portion of the instrument, the
signature cannot have that legal
effect and force which it must have
in order to comply with the statute
and to give authenticity to the
whole of the memorandum." See,
503-506;
also, Fry, Spec. Perf.,
Stokes v. Moore, I COX,219; Hawkins v. Holmes, I P. Wins., 770;
Drury v. Young, s8 Md., 547; Penniman v. Hartshorne, 13 Mass., 87;
Sayres v. Patters6n, 2 W. N. C.,
334.
In Guthrie v. Anderson, 47 Kan.,
383 (I891), the owner oi land signed
a written memorandum for the sale
thereof, executed in the handwriting of the prospective purchaser.
The purchaser's name appeared in
the body of the memorandum, but
it was not signed at the end, either
by himself or by his agent. The
purchaser gave his checl" for the
cash payment, signed by himself
and containing the following
memorandum: "Nick Anders~n
and wife, lot 8, bk. 39, to W. W.

Guthrie." It was held not a suffiThe Court
cient memorandum.
said: "The party charged in the
action is the one who must have
signed. If the Andersons desired
that Mr. Guthrie should be charged
by the writing or memorandum,
they should have required him or
his agent to have signed the same.
The Andersons, who signed the
writing, are bound thereby, and
could not set up the statute in bar.
Mr. Guthrie is not bound, because
neither be nor his agent signed,
and, therefore, he can plead the
statute."
Vendor.-In a recent English
case, Coombs v. Wilkes, 3 Ch., 77
(i892), the defendant signed a
document dated October 7, whereby
he agreed to purchase a freehold
farm for $65o, and stated that he
had paid a certain sum by way of
deposit to " Messrs. R., as agents
for the vendor." The document
continued: " I hereby agree to pay
in the usual way for the tenant
right (the landlord to be considered
as an outgoing tenant according to
the usual custom of the country)."
The vendor's name (Coombs) was
not mentioned in the document,
and he did not sign it, but it was
signed by a clerk of Messrs. R. In
a subsequent letter to the vendor's
solicitor the defendant asked that
the balance of the purchase money
might be allowed to remain on
mortgage, and concluded: "Let
me know by return of post, and
then Mr. Coombs could sign off the
.
I should like a copy
deeds...
of our agreement." The sole question was whetherwithin the Statute
of Frauds, the vendor was sufficiently identified. It was held that
the term "landlord" was not a
sufficient description of the vendor
in the document of October 7, that

UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

such document was not a sufficient

Hotel property," has been held not
a sufficient description of the prop-%
erty to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, it being flncertain
what property was comprehended
in the words "Union Hotel property" without resorting to parol
evidence: King v. Wood, 7 Mo.,
390. So, a memorandum which
describes the land sold as a "lot
of i8th St., 6o x i8o ft., about 3oo
ft. S. of Herbert St.," is not sufficient: Schroeder v. Taaffe, ii Mo. "
App., 267. In Brockway v. Frostm,
40 Minn., 155 (1889), it was held
that an agreement for the conveyance of a designated number of"
acres "in" a specified larger tract
of land, the subject not being otherwise designated, was ineffectual for
uncertainty. A written memorandum of a contract for the sale of
The general rule given by BROW&Z land is insufficient as containing
on the Statute of Frauds ( "371) is no description of the land, when
that the writing required by the the only description is contained
statute "must contain the essential' in a letter to the alleged vendor,
terms of the contract, expressed
which referred to it as "y our land I"
with such a degree of certainty that and such description cannot be
it may be understood without re- supplied by parol evidence of what
course to parol evidence to show land was referred to: Taylor v. Althe intention of the parties." And len, 40 Minn., 433; Breckinridge
v. Crocker, 78 Cal., 529; Leute v.
again, in 385: "It must, of course,
dppear from the memorandum
Clarke, 22 Fla., 515; Francis v.
what is the subject matter of de- Bafry, 69 Mich., 3ii; Sherwood v.
Walker, 66 Mich., 568; and Mafendant's engagement. Land, for
chine Co., v,.
Smith, "16Oreg., 381.
instance, which is purported to be
In Mellon v. Davidson, .j23 Pa.
bargained for, must be so described
St., 298 (1889), a receipt signed by
that it may be identified." See,
defendant showed the payment of
also, Fry, Spec. Perf., 325.
a sum of money on account of the
While this certainty is required,
price of "a lot of ground fronting
the identification may sufficiently
about i9o feet -on the P. R" R., in
appear by reference. The writing
the 21st Ward, P." Held, that it
must be a guide to find the land,
must contain sufficient particulars did not sufficiently identify the
land to comply with the Statute of
to point out and distinguish the
tract from any other. A proposi- Frauds, and was inadmissible in an
tion in writing, accepted by the action for specific performance,
other party, to sell "all that piece though accompanied by two pencil
draughts of land in the vicinity,
of property known as the Union
agreement within the Statute of
frauds, and that the subsequent
letter did not so clearly refer to the
previous document and show the
name of the vendor as to cure the
defect in the document. In the
Massachusetts cases of McGovern
v. Hem, 26 N. E. Rep., 86r (i89i),
and Lewis v. Wood, 26 N. E. Rep.,
862 (x891),' it was held that
memoranda for the sale of land
which omitted to name or describe
in the one case the sellers and in
the other the purchaser, were insufficient to satisfy the statute.
See also Mentz v. Newwitter, 122
N. Y., 421; O'Sullivan v. Overton
(Conn.), 14 At. Rep., 3oo; Quinn
v. Champagne (Minn.), 37 N. W.
Rep., 451.
Descripition of the Proerly.-

870 .;
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which did not appear on theix faces
to be connected with the receipt,
and were not attached thereto, and
supplemented with parol evidence
that the land mentioned was the
same sued for, and that defendant
owned no other in said ward.
In Fox et al. v. Courtney, 20 S.
W. Rep., 20 (Mo. Sup. Ct, 1892),
a petition claimed damages for alleged breach of contract in failing
to purchase "thirty-three feet of
ground on the east side of Grand
Avenue, in Kansas City, Mo.,"
under a contract to purchase
"ground lying between Missouri
Avenue and Sixth Street on the
east side of Grand Avenue." The
petition was held demurrable for
want of a sufficient description of
the land to satisfy the statute. The
Court said: ."We do not think,
reading the contract 'and petition
together, that any land was sufficiently described to satisfy the
statute." Ju McBrayer v. Cohen,
I8 S. W. Rep., 123 (Ky. Sup. Ct.,
1892), an auctioneer at public auction, immediately after selling land
to defendant, signed the following:
A'365 acres, at $2o per acre, Capt.
McBrayer. I certify that the above
is correct. Oct. io, 1888. T. D.
English." This was held a suffii.ent memorandum in writing to
support a suit against defendant.
'Upon the argument that the suit
was not enforceable because the
land was not sufficiently described,
the Court said: "There can be no
doubt of the identity of the land
having been rendered certain by
reference to the printed advertisement of the sale previously made,
which may be considered in con. nection with and in aid of the auctioneer's memorandum in identifying the land sold."
The Consideration.-The
rule

that the memorandum must contain the consideration was laid
down in the case of Wain v. Warlters, 5 East, zo, which went upon
the ground that the statute required
a note of the "agreement," and
that the consideration was an essential element of the agreement.
This case has since been maintained and followed as law in a
long series of English cases. In
this country the State courts differ
as to the necessity for the presence
of this element in the memorandum of sale. In Nibertv. Baghurst,
47 N. T. Eq., 201 (i89o), it was held
that a receipt for $25, "to account
for in the purchase of the meadow
lot," was not a sufficient memorandum. GRgBN, V. C., said: "Since
the revision of 1874 it is not necessary that the consideration of a
contract coming within the statute
should be set out in the memorandum (Revision, p. 446, 9), and the
cases which held that to be a requisite have to that extent become
inapplicable; but it is necessary
that the other parts of the agreement should appear.
In Carroll v. Powell, 48 Ala., 298,
the memorandum, after describing the land, stated as follows:
"Bought by A. Carroll at $400."
.The Court, per PEcx, C. J., said:
"It (the memorandum) does not
state the terms of the sale, whether
for cash or no credit. It is, however, insisted that as it is not stated
whether the sale was for cash or on
credit, the law presumes it was for
cash. Admit this to be true in ordinary sales, it does not, in cases
like the present, answer the requirements of the statute. The statute
requires the terms of the sale to be
stated as a part of the memorandum."
In Shively et al v. Black, 45 Pa.,

